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GUEST EDITORIAL
PRINGLE: LEGAL REASONING, TEXT,
PURPOSE AND TELEOLOGY
PAUL CRAIG*
§1. INTRODUCTION
Not all cases are equally important; they are not equally interesting intellectually and
they are not of equal significance in terms of political relevance. Nor indeed is there
any guarantee that these features will coalesce in a single case. They did however come
together in the Pringle case.' The challenge to the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM)2 ticked all these boxes, especially because its judicial invalidation could well
have sent nervous financial markets into a further downward spiral. A course in EU law
could without difficulty be taught from the ensuing judgment. So too could a course in
legal reasoning. The judgment unfolds like a story, and even though the reader knows or
can hazard a pretty good guess at the ending - that the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) will find that the ESM is lawful - the story is compelling nonetheless,
since the last part of the judgment is also the denouement in which the CJEU saves the
ESM from the most potent challenge to its legality. In doing so, the judgment reveals
much that is of interest about the nature of legal reasoning, in particular the blend
of text, background purpose, and teleology that constitutes the very essence of legal
discourse.
§2. THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM
The euro crisis generated two responses from the EU: assistance, and heightened
supervision over national economic policy. The ESM was the successor to earlier measures
to provide assistance to Member States and entered into force on 8 October 2012.
Professor of English Law, St John's College and the University of Oxford.
Case C-370/12 Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, Judgment of
27 November 2012, not yet reported.
2 See the European Stability Mechanism, www.esm.europa.eu/ (last visited 6 February 2013).
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Article 136 TFEU had been amended by the simplified revision procedure, the result
being a new paragraph 3, which stated that 'the Member States whose currency is the
euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard
the stability of the euro area as a whole',3 the assistance being subject to conditionality.
However, this amendment was not in force in October 2012 and the ESM thus took effect
as an intergovernmental organization based on an international treaty between the euro
area Member States.
The ESM was devised as a permanent rather than temporary mechanism for giving
financial assistance to those in the euro area. Its purpose is set out in Article 3.
The purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilise funding and provide stability support under
strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, to the benefit
of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems,
if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its
Member States. For this purpose, the ESM shall be entitled to raise funds by issuing financial
instruments or by entering into financial or other agreements or arrangements with ESM
Members, financial institutions or other third parties.
The ESM can raise funds by issuing financial instruments or by entering into financial
or other agreements with ESM members, financial institutions or other third parties.
It has a total subscribed capital of 6700 billion, C80 billion of which is in the form of
paid-in capital provided by the euro area Member States in five instalments of C 16
billion. The ESM can also dispose of up to C620 billion of committed 'callable capital'
from euro area Member States. From 1 March 2013, assistance under the ESM is
conditional on ratification by the applicant state of the Treaty on Stability, Governance
and Coordination.
The ESM may provide stability support by: giving loans to countries in financial
difficulties; providing precautionary financial assistance in the form of a credit line;
financing recapitalizations of financial institutions through loans to governments
including in non-programme countries; and purchasing bonds of an ESM Member State
in primary and secondary debt markets.4 The ESM aims to cover its costs and include
an appropriate margin.5 It can borrow on the capital markets from banks, financial
institutions, and so on, for the performance of its purpose. 6
3 European Council Decision 2011/199 of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 TFEU with regard to a
stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, [20111 OJ L 91/1.
4 Articles 14-20 ESM.
5 Article 20(1) ESM.
6 Article 21(1) ESM.
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§3. PRINGLE, COMPETENCE AND EU INSTITUTIONS
The claimant in Pringle made a number of arguments against the legality of the ESM.7
This editorial focuses on the most important, those relating to competence and bailouts.
A. ESM AND CATEGORIES OF EU COMPETENCE
The claimant argued that the ESM was in substance designed to ensure price stability and
save the euro; this was monetary policy, which fell within the EU's exclusive competence,8
and the Member States therefore had no competence to adopt legally binding acts in the
form of an international treaty, the ESM.9 There was force in the contention that the
ESM was in reality directed towards monetary policy given the wording of Articles 3 and
12 ESM, which predicate assistance on the fact that it is indispensable to the financial
stability of the euro area as a whole.
The Member States nonetheless predictably contended that the ESM was concerned
with economic policy, which is not within the EU's exclusive competence. The CJEU,
equally predictably, reached the same conclusion, although the reasoning was strained.
It held that the primary objective of monetary policy was price stability,10 but that this
was distinct from the stability of the euro area as a whole, which was the objective of
Article 136(3) TFEU and the ESM. The CJEU justified this conclusion on the ground
that even 'though the stability of the euro area may have repercussions on the stability
of the currency used within that area, an economic policy measure cannot be treated
as equivalent to a monetary policy measure for the sole reason that it may have indirect
effects on the stability of the euro'.11 This is, with respect, legal formalism, which may
explain why the CJEU moved rapidly on in its judgment without further reasoning
on the point. In economic terms, the stability of the euro area as a whole is surely a
condition precedent to price stability within that area. To put the same point conversely,
it is not clear how there could be price stability in relation to the euro, given the serious
instability of the euro area as a whole.
The claimant further contended that if the subject matter of the amended
Article 136(3) TFEU was regarded as falling within economic policy, Member State
competence to act was nonetheless pre-empted because the EU had occupied the relevant
area. The CJEU rejected this contention. 12 It held that since Articles 2(3) and 5(1) TFEU
restricted the EU's role in economic policy to the adoption of coordinating measures,
the TEU and TFEU did not therefore confer any specific power on the EU to establish
Case C-370/12 Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General.
Article 3(1)(c) TFEU.
Article 2(1) TFEU.
10 Case C-370/12 Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, para. 54, 94.
1 Ibid., para. 56, 96.
12 Ibid., para. 102-107.
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a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by Decision 2011/199 that brought about
the amendment in Article 136(3) TFEU.13 It followed, said the CJEU, from Article 4(1)
and Article 5(2) TEU that competence in this regard remained with the Member States,
who could therefore lawfully conclude the ESM.14 It also followed that Article 136(3)
was regarded as merely 'confirming'15 the Member States' power to establish a stability
mechanism, and created no new Union competence. 16
B. ESM AND EU INSTITUTIONS
The CJEU's preceding conclusion still left open the legality of the EU institutions
participating in such an agreement. The Commission and European Central Bank (ECB)
are integral to the ESM regime." The issues of principle raised by such involvement are
complex.18
The CJEU's response was brief and Delphic. It held that even though the ESM made
use of the Commission and ECB, that fact could not affect 'the validity of Decision
2011/199, which in itself provides only for the establishment of a stability mechanism by
the Member States and is silent on any possible role for the Union's institutions in that
connection'.19
A partial explanation to this response is that the CJEU was dealing with the
question of whether Article 136(3) TFEU could be introduced pursuant to the simplified
revision procedure. The legal reality was, as we have seen, that the ESM took effect as an
international agreement because Article 136(3) had not yet come into effect. The legal
reality was, however, also that the EU institutions were central to the ESM, and the CJEU
provides scant if any guidance as to the legitimacy of such involvement.
This reticence was doubtless due in part to the legal difficulties that might be raised
by such involvement. It was also doubtless due to the fact that when Article 136(3) comes
into effect it will provide a more secure foundation for EU institutional involvement
with the kind of assistance dealt with via the ESM. It is true that Article 136(3) does not
explicitly address EU institutional involvement, but it is a good deal easier to infer EU
institutional capacity to participate in such a schema when it is grounded in the primary
treaty itself.20
13 Ibid., para. 64.
14 Ibid., para. 68, 109.
15 Ibid., para. 72.
16 Ibid., para. 73.
17 Articles 13(1), 13(3), 13(4) ESM.
18 P. Craig, 'The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism',
37 European Law Review 3 (2012), p. 231.
19 Case C-370/12 Pringle v. Government ofIreland, Ireland and the Attorney General, para. 74.
20 The TSCG, by way of contrast, was created after the veto by the UK prevented the desired ends from
being undertaken within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, and there is nothing analogous to
Article 136(3) TFEU.
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§4. PRINGLE AND BAILOUTS
There is no doubt that the claimant's principal argument in Pringle concerned bailouts.
The assiduous reader has to wait until the end of the judgment to see how the Court
tackled this argument, the essence of which was the alleged incompatibility between the
ESM and the no-bailout clause in Article 125 TFEU. This argument had some prima facie
plausibility. The informed observer might well conclude that the ESM was doing just
that, bailing out those Member States such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal that were in
serious financial difficulty. The very language of bailout was deployed repeatedly in the
press and media coverage to capture the assistance provided to such Member States. It
was therefore interesting to see how the CJEU would deal with this aspect of the claim.
A. PURPOSE, TEXT AND CONSEQUENCE
It is axiomatic that recourse to the underlying purpose or objective of a legal provision
is often crucial to its interpretation, since the words do not just 'self-define'. The revealed
purpose is then used to help determine the scope of the particular provision. The CJEU
in Pringle is to be commended for doing just this when interpreting Article 125 TFEU.
The CJEU, drawing inspiration from the Advocate General, held that Article 125 was
not intended to prohibit either the EU or the Member States from granting any form
of financial assistance whatsoever to another Member State, since the EU could grant
assistance pursuant to Article 122(2) TFEU. 21 The CJEU reinforced this conclusion by
arguing that the wording of Article 123 TFEU, which prohibits the ECB and national
central banks from granting 'overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility',
was stricter than that in Article 125 TFEU, which thereby lent support to the view that
the no-bailout clause was not intended to prohibit all kinds of financial assistance to a
Member State. 22
It was therefore necessary, said the CJEU, to consider the objective underlying
Article 125 to decide what forms of financial assistance were prohibited.23 The CJEU
adverted to preparatory work on the Maastricht Treaty and correctly concluded that the
aim of Article 125 TFEU was to ensure that Member States remained subject to the logic
of the market, which would prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline. 24
It followed that Article 125 TFEU must be held to 'prohibit the EU and Member
States from granting financial assistance as a result of which the incentive of the recipient
Member State to conduct a sound budgetary policy is diminished'. 25
21 Case C-370/12 Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, para. 130-131.
22 Ibid., para. 132.
23 Ibid., para. 133.
24 Ibid., para. 135.
25 Ibid., para. 136.
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This reasoning is surely correct. The purpose of Article 125 was to engender sound
national budgetary policy. It was to ensure that states remained subject to the logic of the
market when they became indebted, and hence any assistance that would, in the words
of the Court, 'diminish' the incentive of the Member State to conduct sound budgetary
policy should fall within the prohibition of Article 125 TFEU.
It is the conclusions drawn from this premise that are more contestable. The Court
held that, provided that the state remains ultimately responsible to its creditors, and
provided that conditions are attached to assistance designed to foster sound budgetary
policy, then it is not prohibited by Article 125 TFEU.26 The ESM was therefore compatible
with Article 125 TFEU because the participating Member States were not 'liable for
the commitments of a Member State which receives stability support and nor do they
assume those commitments, within the meaning of Article 125 TFEU'.27 ESM assistance
did not render Member States the guarantor of debts of the recipient state, nor did they
assume the debts of that state. 28 The recipient state remained liable to repay the sums lent,
which included also an appropriate margin. This was said to be true also for assistance
through bond purchases on the primary and secondary markets, which were regarded as
comparable to loans from the recipient state, and which retained ultimate responsibility
in terms of repayment. 29
Economic reality renders this neat juncture between the purpose/objective of
Article 125 and its interpretation a good deal more tenuous. The judgment is expressly
predicated on the assumption that a Member State should remain subject to the logic
of the market in relation to its debts, that this will instil budgetary discipline, and that
any assistance that 'diminishes' the incentive to maintain sound budgetary policy is
prohibited. This premise is used by the Court to yield the conclusion that any assistance
is allowed, provided only that it is conditional and that ultimate responsibility for
repayment resides with the recipient state. The very idea that conditional assistance
given by the ESM does not diminish incentives for sound budgetary policy is nonetheless
difficult to accept for three reasons.
First, it is easy, given the complexity of this area, to lose sight of the fundamental
thread that underpins the ESM: the assistance is provided on terms or in circumstances
that would not be provided by the ordinary markets. That is the very raison d'itre of the
ESM. There is in that sense a real tension between the purpose underlying Article 125 and
its interpretive realization by the Court. Thus to take but one example, ESM intervention
to buy bonds of the ailing state on the primary market may well, as the CJEU stated, be
in effect a loan that has to be repaid. This however ignores the fact that such assistance
is required because the market was either unwilling to provide the assistance, or was
only willing to do so at interest rates that the state could not afford. The existence of
26 Ibid., para. 137, 143, 146.
27 Ibid., para. 146.
28 Ibid., para. 138-139.
29 Ibid., para. 140-141.
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ESM stability support thus diminishes the incentive for budgetary probity by holding
out the possibility of assistance in circumstances, or on terms, that the market would not
provide. This is not altered by the fact that the recipient state must pay an 'appropriate
margin' for the financial assistance granted,30 since this will still be considerably less
than the cost of such assistance from the ordinary market.
Second, the preceding argument is not met merely because the assistance is given
subject to strict conditionality. It is tempting to suggest that any diminution in national
budgetary responsibility is offset by the strict conditions imposed, which have to be met
before successive tranches of funding are released. It is true that the conditions imposed
have been stringent, and that the impact on national workers has been severe. The key
issue is nonetheless whether the ESM regime diminishes the incentive for national
financial probity and hence falls within the prohibition in Article 125. The operative
inquiry must therefore be the impact on that incentive flowing from a bailout subject
to strict conditions, as compared to that of an incentive if there was no bailout, and the
market failed to provide the funds needed by the state or did so only at a prohibitive cost.
If a state knows that there is a strong chance that it will be bailed-out if it is financially
irresponsible, on terms that the market would not supply, this will, other things being
equal, diminish its sense of budgetary responsibility when compared to the state for
which no bailout is available. This conclusion is not altered by the strict conditions
imposed on the former, because the disruptive effect on national economic life would be
even greater in the latter circumstance where no bailout is available. If the markets fail to
provide the funds, or do so at a cost that is not sustainable for the state, then this would
rapidly lead to an inability to pay wages, debt and the like, with dramatic results for
employment and economic stability. There would moreover be no orderly recovery plan.
Third, the CJEU's conclusion that the ESM regime does not diminish the Member
State's incentive for financial probity is predicated on the assumption that the recipient
state will repay its debt, but it may well default on repayment, or so extend the repayment
period that the obligation to reimburse becomes more theoretical than real. The larger the
assistance, and the smaller the economy, the less likely that repayment will be an economic
reality. This is why the ESM has provisions to deal with non-repayment, which are based
on the assumption that other ESM members will pick up the unpaid tab.31
B. TELEOLOGY, TEXT AND CONSEQUENCE
It is common for textual argumentation as to the scope of a particular treaty article to be
shaped by background teleological assumptions or objectives. These may be apparent on
the face of the judgment. They may be implicit in the Court's reasoning. The degree of
work done by such argumentation will depend in part on how far the Court believes that
30 Article 20 ESM.
31 Article 25 ESM.
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it can go towards its desired conclusion through purely textual analysis, and how far it is
willing to give voice to the telos underlying a particular scheme of treaty provisions. In this
context, given the limits of what can be achieved by textual interpretation addressed in the
previous section, it may well be that greater teleological input was required to save the ESM.
Thus it might be contended that Article 125 was designed with individual cases
in mind, preventing bailouts of particular states when national fiscal policy or
irresponsibility led to problems confined to that state. Article 125, and the more general
schema in Articles 122-126 TFEU, were not on this view structured so as to cope with
the circumstance where the very future of the euro was at stake, with the consequence
that assistance had to be provided by the Member States, considerations of moral hazard
had to be severely compromised, and could only be given expression through strict
conditions attached to funding assistance. This sentiment has been captured by Tuori,
through the invocation of the idea of a double telos. There was the telos embodied in
Article 125 itself, expressive of the view that fiscal liability remained with the particular
Member State. This should nonetheless be read as subject to a 'second-order telos' where
the very survival of the euro was at stake. 32
[T]he no-bailout provision clearly aims to induce Member States to responsible fiscal policy
and to ward off the moral hazard which awareness of other Member States' coming to the
rescue in a sovereign debt crisis could entail. This aim also justifies treating different forms
of financial assistance in equal terms under this provision. But a teleological interpretation
should heed not only the particular telos of the no-bailout clause but also the more general
objective of the regulative whole Art 125(1) is part of. And this 'second-order' telos of the
no-bailout clause undoubtedly includes the financial stability of the euro area as a whole.
This argument supports the legal impeccability of Member-State assistance, in spite of the
no-bailout clause and the inapplicability of the emergency provision in Art 122(2) TFEU. But
it also justifies and even presupposes, at least to a certain extent, the 'strict conditionality'
of assistance. The viewpoint of moral hazard retains its relevance even when retreat from
stringent bailout prohibition is considered legally possible.
This rationale coheres with economic reality and is reflected in key provisions of the ESM.
Thus Article 3 and Article 12 ESM are both predicated on assistance being necessary to
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole. So too is Article 136(3) TFEU.
Advocate General Kokott adverted to teleological argumentation in support of her
textual analysis of the scope of Article 125. She focused on Member State sovereignty
to help justify a reading of Article 125 that would uphold the legality of the ESM. It was
sovereignty in the form of the capacity of Member States to protect their shared interest
that was paramount. 33
32 K. Tuori,'The European Financial Crisis - Constitutional Aspects and Implications', EUILaw Working
Papers No. 28 (2012), p. 24.
33 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-370/12 Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and
the Attorney General, para. 139-140.
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If a prohibition under European Union law even on indirect assumption of liabilities were
recognised, that would hinder the Member States from deploying financial resources in order
to attempt to prevent the negative effects of the bankruptcy of another Member State on their
own economic and financial situation. Given the mutual interdependence of the Member
States' individual economic activities which is encouraged and intended under European
Union law, substantial damage could be caused by the bankruptcy of one Member State to
other Member States also. That damage might possibly be so extensive that an additional
consequence would be to endanger the survival of monetary union, as submitted by a number
of parties to the proceedings.
There is no question here of finding that such a danger to the stability of the monetary union
exists or of examining how such a danger should best be combated. It must onlybe emphasized
that a broad interpretation of Article 125 TFEU would, also in such circumstances, deprive
the Member States of the power to avert the bankruptcy of another Member States and of the
ability thereby to attempt to avert damage to themselves. In my opinion, such an extensive
restriction on the sovereignty of the Member States to adopt measures for their own protection
cannot be founded on a broad teleological interpretation of a legal provision the wording of
which does not unambiguously state that restriction.
§5. CONCLUSION
The legal saving of the ESM will not of course cure the underlying problems with the
euro area. That will require longer term measures of the kind that are already sketched in
the report by the 'Four Presidents'.34 There is, however, little doubt that the legal result in
Pringle was greeted with quiet relief in the corridors of power in Brussels and elsewhere.
For lawyers the case will hold a longer term interest, exemplifying the conjunction of
text, purpose, and teleology that informs legal reasoning.
3 H. Van Rompuy in close collaboration with J.M. Barroso, J.-C. Juncker and M. Draghi, 'Towards a
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union', 5 December 2012, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms
Data/docs/pressdatalen/ec134069.pdf (last visited 6 February 2013).
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